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Abstract
Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are temporary
wireless networks useful in emergency rescue services,
battlefields operations, mobile conferencing and a variety of
other useful applications. Due to dynamic nature and lack of
centralized monitoring points, these networks are highly
vulnerable to attacks. Intrusion detection systems (IDS)
provide audit and monitoring capabilities that offer the local
security to a node and help to perceive the specific trust level
of other nodes. We take benefit of the clustering concept in
MANETs for the effective communication between nodes,
where each cluster involves a number ofmember nodes and is
managed by a cluster-head. It can be taken as an advantage
in these battery and memory constrained networks for the
purpose of intrusion detection, by separating tasks for the
head and member nodes, at the same time providing
opportunity for launching collaborative detection approach.
The clustering schemes are generally used for the routing
purposes to enhance the route efficiency. However, the effect
of change of a cluster tends to change the route; thus
degrades the performance. This paper presents a low-
overhead clustering algorithm for the benefit of detecting
intrusion rather than efficient routing. It also discusses the
intrusion detection techniques with the help of this simplified
clustering scheme.
Keywords: Ad hoc networks, intrusion detection, clustering
scheme, election process.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad hoc network are infrastructure-less networks.
Besides useful in military and rescue operations, and mobile
conferencing, etc. these are susceptible to many type of
attacks, including black hole, denial-of-service, selfishness,
route fabrication, etc [1]. The distributed infrastructure-less
nature of MANETs makes intrusion detection a challenge.
Normal intrusion detection (ID) approaches cannot be
deployed in this environment. A scalable, fault-tolerant IDS is
required to govern these non-secure wireless ad-hoc networks
against malicious behavior (or attackers). Since these
networks lack in any sort of infrastructure, we need to
monitor intrusions at all nodes in the network. However, due
to mobility and other constraints such as restricted power and
processing capacity, nodes cannot run heavy applications to
detect intrusions.
Therefore, the architecture should be simple yet effective
to provide security against different type of attacks. The more
efficient solution is to defend against intrusion co-operatively,
rather than each mobile node performing full analysis of
traffic passing through it. In order to co-operate, the nodes
must trust on each other so that they should not audit all the
data, and hence, they can save a lot more processing and
memory overhead. The clustering schemes like Cluster-based
Routing Protocol (CBRP) [2, Cluster Switch Gateway
Routing (CSGR) [3], and on-demand clustering [4, 5] result in
a monitoring node, called the "Head node", which can be
trusted in this regard if the selection of head node is based
upon fair and secure criteria.
Our prior architecture [6] for detecting intrusions in ad hoc
networks using mobile agents had separate modules for
cluster-heads and cluster-members. We aimed to use ad-hoc
clustering protocols such as CBRP or CSGR, since only the
cluster-head node forwards the data packets on behalf of all
the cluster members; thus increasing route efficiency by
reducing network traffic. However, the existing clustering
protocols are not widely used in Ad-hoc networks. Another
important drawback with the clustering protocols is that the
clusters need to be changed whenever the route is changed.
Therefore, we propose a generalized clustering algorithm that
can be used specifically for ID purpose irrespective of the
routes.
Our architecture is simple in terms of clustering and
election process, and effective in terms of intrusion detection
and response. Each cluster is managed by a cluster-head for
intra-cluster management (managing member nodes) and
inter-cluster communication (for coordinated detection and
response with adjacent clusters). The cluster-members are
ordinary nodes that parse the data for intrusion during the
communication and may seek help from the cluster-head to
detect intrusion if they find some suspicious activity but their
gathered information is still incomplete.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
outlines the work done in IDS and clustering fields for ad-hoc
networks. Section 3 discusses the cluster formation algorithm
via election process. In section 4, we briefly discuss the
intrusion detection framework using our proposed clustering
scheme. Section 5 contains the conclusion.
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2. RELATED WORK
This section relates to two different domains of ad-hoc
network. Securing ad-hoc networks by means of intrusion
detection schemes have been proposed using different
architectures [7, 8], and is discussed in section 2.1. Section
2.2 is related to the clustering protocols in NIANETs.
2.1 IDS in Ad-hoc Networks
Zhang et al. [7] proposed a modular approach that is local
and independent to each node. In case of some inconclusive
evidence, each node can collaborate with neighboring nodes.
Each node runs IDS agent comprised of 6 modules, that
include local and global detection engine and response
modules. They use the multi-layer integration approach to
analyze the attack scenario in its entirety to achieve better
performance. However, this architecture is complex since
each node maintains local and global ID mechanism,
anomalies and response methods; thus storing lot of
information independently, which leads to memory overhead.
Li et al. [8] used the mobile agent (MA) technology for
coordinated IDS in ad-hoc networks. This architecture uses
the cluster-head as Manager that contains Assistant and
Response MAs, while each node runs a Host Monitor Agent
to detect network, file, and user intrusion using Intrusion
Analyzer and Interpretation Base. The assistant agent is
responsible for collecting the data from the cluster-member
nodes, while the response agent is used for informing the
cluster-member nodes about a certain response. It does not
use the multi-layer detection approach. Also, it does not use
the clustering approach to minimize the intrusion response
flooding.
2.2 Clustering in Ad-hoc Networks
CBRP [2] is a distributed, efficient and scalable protocol
that uses clustering approach to minimize on-demand route
discovery traffic. The cluster-head is elected for each cluster
to maintain cluster membership information. The nodes
periodically exchange HELLO packets to maintain a neighbor
table and to maintain a 2-hop topology link state table. To
discover 3 hop away cluster-heads, cluster adjacency table
(CAT) is exchanged in HELLO message. It does not allow
two cluster-heads to have a direct bi-directional link to each
other. CBRP also opposes frequent elections. The overhead,
however, in this scheme is to maintain neighbor table and
CAT at every node; thus involving bulky traffic and
processing load. Also, two heads in a radio range are not a
problem in our architecture and they are automatically
adjusted after election timeout.
Passive Clustering (PC) [4, 5] is relatively a new paradigm
of clustering that forms clusters only at the time of need.
Though, this type of clustering reduces routing to the
minimum extent, but involves high complexity when clusters
are formed at the time of route setup. For every route to be
established, the clusters must be formed first (if not already
built). This increases route setup time due to the control
information that is exchanged between the nodes. Another
important drawback in PC relates to security. If a node needs
to establish the route, it becomes the cluster-head; hence, the
intruders cannot be prevented on becoming the cluster-head.
3. CLUSTER FORMATION VIA ELECTION
PROCESS
The clusters are formed to obtain the head node to monitor
traffic within its cluster. The cluster-head not only manages
its own cluster, but also provides a way for communication to
other clusters. It maintains information of every member node
and neighbor clusters (forwarded by the gateway node). The
neighbor information is useful for network-wide
communication. The cluster management responsibility is
rotated among the capable members of the cluster for load
balancing and fault tolerance [9] and must be fair and secure
[1]. We achieve this by conducting regular elections. Our
election process is simple. It does not require the clique
computation [1], or the neighbor information [2]. The cluster-
head keeps an election interval timer for managing the
elections. Every node in the cluster must participate in the
election process by casting their vote showing their
willingness to become the cluster-head. The node showing the
highest willingness (or proves the best following some criteria)
becomes the cluster-head until the next timeout period.
The rest of the section explains the important parts of
clustering and election process. It discusses the status of
nodes, the information to be kept, explanation of HELLO
messages, and cluster-head nomination process. We have also
explained the methods by which the election votes and the
announced result can be verified. We also evaluate the
performance of our clustering scheme used for intrusion
detection with the scheme presented in [1].
3.1 Node Status
We take the node states from CBRP [2] and PC [4]:
UNDECIDED (UD), HEAD (HD), MEMBER (MB), and
GATEWAY (GW). Every node comes up in UD state. It
switches to MB state if it finds any HD node in its neighbor,
otherwise it switches to HD state (if succeeds in election). If
the connection ofMB nodes with their HD node breaks, they
fall back to UD state. However, ifMB node finds another HD
node among its neighbor (due to mobility or election process),
it becomes GW. Both the MB or GW nodes can move to HD
state after election. Simultaneously, HD node upon failing in
the election process becomes MB or GW (depending upon
number of HD nodes, it is linked to). The GW node upon
loosing all its HD nodes except one goes back to MB State.
The transition of node states discussed is shown in figure 1.
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Figure 1 . Transition diagram of nodes taking
part in the cluster formation
3.2 Data Structures
We use 2 types of data structures, "Member Table" and
"Cluster Adjacency Table" (CAT), as in [2]. Since our
proposed architecture does not perform routing, we reduce
processing and storage space at each node by keeping all-
neighbor information only at the head node. The member
nodes do not keep the information about their neighbors
(except their respective head node) as communication among
the member nodes is not required. The cluster-head maintains
connections with all its neighbors (MB or GW) in member
table using HELLO messages. The fields in member table are
Neighbor ID, Status (MB or GW) and an Expiry Timer. The
timers associated with each entry are used to delete stale
entries. MB and GW nodes only keep information of their
respective head nodes in their member tables.
Communication with adjacent clusters is done via cluster-
heads. HD nude maintains neighbor cluster information in
CAT with the help of its GW nodes. GW node forwards its
member table to the HD node by which HD adds/updates
entries in its CAT. This table contains 4 fields: Cluster ID,
Cluster HEAD ID, Link ("Direct" or ID of GW) and an
Expiry Timer (same as in Member table).
3.3 HELLO Messages
HELLO messages are used to maintain connectivity. If all
nodes in the network start broadcasting HELLO after
HELLO_INTERVAL, the network would be too congested
and much processing would be involved. Therefore, the better
idea is to periodically broadcast HELLO only from HD node
after every hello timer, rather than all nodes broadcasting
HELLO. When neighbor nodes receive HELLO from a HD,
they simply reply with unicast HELLO to show their presence.
Besides HD, a UD node can also broadcast the HELLO
message. This is done to find any HD node, and starts
HELLO_INTERVAL timer. If some HD node replies, the UD
node changes its status to MB. Nodes other than HD simply
drop the packet. If timer expires and no HD node replies, the
UD node starts election. It is mandatory for a UD node to
broadcast at least 1 HELLO packet before starting the election.












Figure 2. Different scenarios for reply to
broadcast HELLO from UD node
(Bold line show Broadcast message,
Dashed line show Unicast message)
Figure 2 demonstrates the process of a UD node
broadcasting HELLO. In figure 2a, UD node broadcasts
HELLO, gets response from HD and becomes MB. Figure 2b
shows that UD node becomes GW after getting response from
2 HD nodes. In figure 2c, it is shown that UD node starts
election after not receiving any response for its broadcasts
HELLO. On becoming HD, MB nodes in neighbor become
GW and UD nodes convert to MB.
3.4 Cluster-head Nomination
The election process is taken from Zhang [1] with a few
modifications. The cluster-head is nominated via election.
The process is simple and can either be initiated by HD or by
UD. The initiator node (HD or UD) collects the votes, process
them and announce the results. The HD node initiates the
process after every ELECTION INTERVAL. This rotation of
cluster-head helps in gaining security and fairness [1]. A UD
node starts election if it does not find any HD node in its
neighbor. If UD node initiates the election, only nodes with
UD status can take part in the election process.
Our election process contains 4 types of packets:
ELECTION START (ES) shows the start of election process,
ELECTION VOTE (EV) is used to cast the vote
(willingness), ELECTION DONE (ED) is sent to inform the
result of election, and ELECTION HEAD (EH) is the last
packet sent by the new HD node.
The initiator broadcasts ES packet containing the hashed
value of willingness (vote) to become the HD node [1] and
starts VOTE TIMER. Hash is calculated using the sender
node ID. The receiving nodes reply with unicast ES
containing their hashed vote. All the votes that come after
vote timer are dropped. The initiator then sends EV packet
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having original value of its vote. The receiving nodes take the
hash of EV and compare with the value of ES to confirm the
correctness, and reply with their EV packets. The initiator
node also checks the correctness for all nodes by comparing
the hashed of ES with that of ES. If a participator finds error
in the initiator's vote, it does not further participate in that
Election. Similarly, if the initiator node finds error with some
node's vote, it eliminates that node in electing new HD. The
initiator node then processes the votes and announces the
result by broadcasting ED packet. It also contains the votes of
all the nodes. ED packet also contains the votes of all
participants to confirm that the initiator node has not changed
the values. The initiator node announces the result, following
which newly elected cluster-head acknowledges by
broadcasting EH packet to confirm that it has taken charge for
the next session.
After the election process, the previous HD node, and
other nodes change their status. If a node is not directly linked
with the new HD (and with no other HD), it goes to UD state.
It broadcasts HELLO and after hello timer, starts election.
This helps in eliminating UD nodes within a short period of
time. Every UD node starts the election process again unless
all the UD nodes convert to some other status.
If the initiator node does not receive any reply for ES
packet until VOTE TIMER, it ends the process by
announcing itself as elected HD. A node participating in 1
election neither participates in any other election, nor
entertains any Hello message. If, however, some HD node
receives ES packet from a UD node, it sends unicast HELLO
to the UD node, which causes UD to discontinue the election
process and it transforms itself to MB state. The
ELECTION INTERVAL can be chosen on the basis of
mobility factor. If the nodes are static, re-election will only be
required for fairness and not for reorganizing the topology.
On the other hand, if the nodes are highly mobile, re-election
period must be low so as to maintain the network structure
within time. Therefore, we compute.
ELECTION-INTERVAL = Radio Range
Movement Speed
The radio range of an ad hoc node is 250 m, while node
movement speeds in our simulation are 5 50 m/s. It implies
that re-election process timeout should be 50 seconds for
nodes that are moving with 5m/s speed, while nodes that
move with 50m/s speed start the process after almost 5
seconds. This is intentional because a highly mobile node
moves out from radio range of its cluster in max. 5 seconds.
3.5 Verification of Votes and Results
The election votes must be verifiable. We use the common
hash function [1], but still a node can advertise the highest
possible number in the limit given if the random numbers [1]
are used. For example, if a node (or even the initiator itself)
knows about the selection criteria for new HD, it can
announce the ideal value during the election process.
Therefore, the willingness to become CH must be computed
on base of some parameters like number of links, load-
capacity, etc., and still that can be verified (sending a 2-hop
broadcast message and receiving replies can verify the
number of links of a node).
The cluster-head is responsible for collection and
processing of votes, and announcing the result. There may be
a case when initiator node itself it an intruder. After collecting
EV packets from neighbor nodes, it can change value of the
votes greater than its own vote in ED, since the neighbor
nodes trust on the result formulation of current HD node.
Therefore, the nodes whose values have been changed can
take no action against the initiator.
The feasible solution to cater this situation is to broadcast
the hashed values of all nodes in EV packet, and the original
votes of all nodes in ED packet. If a node desires to verify the
result, it can take hash of each vote in ED packet and compare
it with respective hashed value in EV packet.
3.6 Comparative Analysis
Zhang and Lee [1] performed clique computation before
forming clusters that not only employs overhead in the
election processes, but also increase the number of clusters
and HELLO messages. Our election process is simple since
during the election process, if some node does not have a bi-
directional link, it is obvious that it cannot take part in process
(cannot reply to election packets) and forms its own cluster.
CBRP [2] carries out a re-election process when 2 HD
nodes come in contention. However, we do not perform re-
election process since we are not dealing with the routes. In
this way, we effectively reduce the overhead of performing
elections when a cluster-head has high mobility. The HD
nodes in contention are automatically adjusted after timeout.
We test our simulations using the topology from [10], as
shown in figure 3a. The results show improvement of our
clustering scheme compared to the process discussed in [1]. It
resulted in 9 clusters using clique computation as shown in
figure 3b. The best case results from our simplified clustering
scheme results in only 5 clusters, as shown in figures 3c and
3d. Figure 3e shows the moderate case having 6 clusters, and
is due to the reason that in our scheme, 2 HD nodes remain in
contention unless election timeout. The worst case of our
clustering scheme is depicted in figure 3f, having 7 clusters.
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Figure 3. Different scenarios of our clustering
scheme using 18-node topology
(HD nodes are shown in Red, GW nodes in
Yellow and Member nodes in Black)
The intrusion detection is used to detect attempted
intrusion into a computer or network. It processes audit data,
performs analysis and take certain set of actions against the
intruder, such as blocking them and/or warn the system
administrator. In ad hoc networks, which lacks in centralized
audit points [2], it is necessary to use the IDS in a distributed
manner. This also helps in reducing computation and memory
overhead from each node.We relate our clustering approach
with the intrusion detection process in such a manner that
partial analysis of the incoming traffic is done at the head
node and the intermediary or destination member node. The
traffic analysis at head node and packet analysis at member
node [1] is helpful in reducing processing at each node. The
HD node needs to be the most trusted node in the cluster,
since it can look for "cooperative" intrusion detection upon
the request of any cluster-member. If some malicious activity
is found, it informs its members and the neighboring clusters
to take certain set of actions. In short, it is the responsibility
of cluster-head to obtain help from and/or inform the member
nodes and neighboring clusters for a particular intrusion. It is
important to note that a UD node performs its own audit and
analysis; however, it performs partial analysis immediately
after becoming HD or MB
The rest of the section explains 5 modules of our proposed
intrusion detection architecture. It discusses about logging
done by the HD node for the traffic passed through its cluster,
and the information to be kept at each node about the known
intrusions. We also briefly explain the methods for intrusion
information, detection, prevention and response.
4.1. Logging Module
HD node logs all the traffic transferred through its radio
range. It captures all the traffic in the promiscuous mode and
keeps the necessary fields in a database. This database can be
used in future for intrusion prevention. When some MB node
informs it about some found intrusion, it checks the log and
finds out actual intruder (may be a case when sending node is
using spoofed ID or an intermediary node start to drop the
packets). Therefore, the log can be used for traffic analysis.
4.2. Intrusion Information Module
Every node maintains a database known as "intrusion
interpretation base", which includes the process of "learning"
[8]. All the signatures that cause an intrusion must be kept in
the database. The anomalous behaviors must also be well
defined with proper upper and lower threshold values. The
detection process may be used for either misuse signature or
anomaly behavior (to conserve power and battery life) or both
of them (to perform conclusive and efficient detection). The
database or anomalous values can be updated manually or on
the base of response from other network nodes.
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4.3. Intrusion Detection Module
Intrusions can occur at every layer of TCP/IP stack. It is
necessary to detect and respond against intrusions specifically
at all layers. For example, in the absence of any firewall, IDS
is necessary, for detection of attacks such as "back-door" or
DoS [7]. This module describes the detection mechanism at
all the layers. At the application layer, we can monitor user
authorization, login attempts, application access, trust
management, and key management. At the transport layer, the
established sessions, protocols usage, connection time, and
etc can be handled. Routing table management and route
update notification and verification are the important aspects
of network layer. At the data link layer, the transmitting nodes,
CSMA/CD, used channels, etc need to be handled. The
concerns at the physical layer include eavesdropping and
avoidance against noise and false messages [11]. The log-
based detection is useful for the partial analysis at the cluster-
head against a certain data sending node.
4.4. Intrusion Prevention Module
When a node experiences some intrusion, it asks its HD to
check the log for the detailed traffic analysis. After processing
the log, the HD generates a response to all member nodes and
neighbor clusters. If the HD fails to detect the intruder
(possibly when the actual sender does not belong to its own
cluster), it requests neighbor cluster heads for coordinated
detection. The neighbor cluster-head checks its log (or asks
further cluster-heads) to complete the process.
4.5. Intrusion Response Module
To inform other nodes about some found intrusion, the
member and head nodes generate different types of response.
The response may be local to the cluster or global to the
whole network. When a member node detects an intrusion
without any help from cluster-head, it takes "self-response"
(e.g. blocking the current user) and informs the cluster-head
about the intrusion. The cluster-head logs the entry and
informs other nodes about the same response.
The cluster-head generates a "cluster-based response" to
the cluster in any of the 3 cases: a member node has informed
about an intrusion, after log-based detection, or after getting
response from adjacent cluster. The cluster-head can also
generate a "network-wide response". In the first 2 cases of
cluster-based response, network-wide response is optional,
whereas in the third case, it is mandatory to inform the whole
network about the intrusion and the response. It is the duty of
the cluster-heads to inform their neighbor clusters. These
cluster-heads then informs their members about the received
response. In this case, all the nodes in the network are
informed about a misbehaving node, or some fabricated route
message without much flooding.
In this paper, we proposed an ID architecture for ad-hoc networks
that is simple and offers low over head in terms of memory usage
and number of messages exchange. We proposed a generalized ID
clustering scheme that can be deployed on top of any ad-hoc routing
protocol. In our proposed algorithm extra care has been taken to
ensure fast, efficient and fair election process. This scheme is useful
to coordinate among different nodes for intrusion detection,
prevention and response against attacks using a cooperative
approach within the ad-hoc network. We look forward to implement
intrusion detection scheme to prove effectiveness of our proposed
clustering algorithm.
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